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Recently Congress has been moving to enact legislation that
enhances the role of riBk analysis in policy-making. The various
risk-benefit analyses, risk comparisons, and risk characterizations
mandated by the bills under consideration may provide valuable data
for risk analysts and risk managers.(U However, we wish to
question a central assumption underlying this legislation: that
the provision of more information through these procedures will
improve risk communication and reduce conflict over risk
management.
For example, one editorial suggested that
To enhance the proper reporting of environmental
risks to the public, . . . Congress (should] insist that
the degree of scientific uncertainty in risk estimates be
reported to the public. ... (p. 141)(1)
Others assume that explaining uncertainty in health risk assessment
will lead to more informed citizens and promote trust in the
producers of risk estimates.t2>
However, these assumptions do not appear to be based on
empirical evidence. Our recent research'3' suggests that
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discussions of uncertainty in health risk assessment may tend to
increase perceived risk. Presentation of information about
uncertainty seems to have little effect on trust in the agency
providing the risk assessment, except for a minority for whom
discussions of uncertainty appear to increase suspicions about the
agency's honesty and competence.
In view of these findings and the general dearth of evidence,
it is difficult to understand the support on risk communication
grounds for such bills as H.R. 2910, the so-called Risk
Communication Act of 1993.(*' This bill would require USEPA to
characterize the risks of a given activity or substance, and
present this information to the public, in great detail. The
agency must judge inconsistencies between positive and negative
laboratory and epidemiological data, note alternative models,
exposure scenarios and assumptions, provide best risk and
population estimates (with uncertainty ranges noted), and risk
comparisons, among other tasks.
Nowhere in this bill or published reviews of it does there
appear to be any discussion (much less evidence) showing that
provision of this information will make citizens better informed.
It is disturbing to see legislators advance legislation that will
have major national impacts without data demonstrating need and
efficacy. It is surprising that people who would not dream of
proposing a risk management action without evidence showing that it
would improve public health and safety would support Buch a bill
without similar evidence to support it.
Legislators and many risk analysts appear to be misdiagnosing
the problem. Seeing great social conflict over environmental
issues, they assume that the problem is with the public. They
believe the solution is risk communication, defined as conveying
technical risk information to citizens in order to lead them to the
same risk management conclusions as the experts.
This hypothesis ignores research findings indicating that
technical risk information is far less important to social conflict
over hazards than other factors, such as trust.<5) Experts who
engage in great debates over risk assessment—e.g., over the
validity of extrapolating from animal data to humans<8>—seem to
forget those arguments when they expect the authority of science to
awe laypeople into silence. That authority does not exist for risk
assessment, and may not exist for any science today.
Thrusting the details of a limited science like risk
assessment into the public arena, as bills like H.R. 2910 propose,
appears to us to be a recipe for disaster. Fully airing the
complexities of risk analysis and the disagreements among experts
is far more likely to arouse public distrust, and demands for risk
reduction, than it is to assuage their concerns. It is possible,
although unlikely, that provision of the information required by
H.R. 2910, S. 110, and other bills would ease conflict within the
community of hazard policy-makers. It is a near-certainty that
this information will do nothing to still the wider public debate
without greater inclusion of citizens in risk management decisions.
It may even increase alienation from a policy process that seems to
many citizens to ignore their concerns, attend to all interests but
that of the public good, and engage in technical language to hide
malfeasance and incompetence.
We agree with our fellow scientists that, all else being
equal, more information is better. We would be disturbed if anyone
drew from these comments or our research a conclusion that
technical information should be withheld from the public. What we
object to is the apparent assumption that knowledge about the
effectiveness of potential means for conflict resolution is
unnecessary for policy.
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